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Abstract
Taxpayer nudges – behavioral interventions that aim to increase tax compliance without
changing the underlying economic incentives of taxpayers – are used increasingly by gov-
ernments because of their potential cost-effectiveness in raising tax revenue. We collect
about a thousand treatment effect estimates from over 40 randomized controlled trials,
and in a meta-analytical framework show that non-deterrence nudges – interventions
pointing to elements of individual tax morale – are on average ineffective in curbing tax
evasion, while deterrence nudges – interventions emphasizing traditional determinants
of compliance such as audit probabilities and penalty rates – are potent catalysts of
compliance. These effects are, however, fairly small in magnitude. Deterrence nudges
increase the probability of compliance by only 1.5-2.5 percentage points more than
non-deterrence nudges, while the effects are likely to be bound to the short-run, and
are somewhat inflated by selective reporting of results.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a lot of excitement around the idea of using “nudges” with the aim
to improve individual behavior. Nudges are interventions that respect the freedom of choice
and leave economic incentives intact (Benartzi et al. 2017),1 and they have been studied
in many important policy areas such as taxation (Mascagni 2018), education (Dizon-Ross
2019), healthcare (Wisdom et al. 2010), consumer behavior (Costa and Kahn 2013), among
others.
In the field of taxation,2 nudging has become widely popular in the last decade among
policy makers who often claim that relative to the negligible direct cost of nudging (e.g.,
sending a letter) the potential payoffs involved can be extremely high.3 Academic economists,
on the other hand, have come to recognize that a large behavioral response to a simple in-
formational update induced by a nudge is not overly consistent with expected utility theories
of human behavior where tax compliance is primarily driven by fundamental economic incen-
tives.4 Such evidence showing that agents respond to nudges would at least demonstrate
the presence of information imperfections (e.g., taxpayers misperceive the probability of being
detected when evading), and would possibly hint to the existence of deviations from utility
maximization (e.g., taxpayers additionally care about tax morale).5
1Thaler and Sunstein (2008) define a nudge as an “aspect of the choices architecture that alters people’s
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incen-
tives.” They continue that for an intervention “to count as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and
cheap to avoid”.
2The most widely used nudge intervention in the field of taxation unfolds as a structured communication
campaign where the tax administration delivers some content to the taxpayers that qualifies to the properties
of being a nudge as defined above by Thaler and Sunstein (2008). Sunstein (2014) presents a list of common
nudges.
3For instance, Hallsworth et al. (2017) and Bott et al. (2017) report £9 million and $25 million increase
in tax revenues, respectively, due to letters sent. Although, typically these letters are interpreted of being
virtually costless, Allcott and Kessler (2019) argues that nudges entail significant costs for the nudge recipients
and shows that the failure to take into account these costs overstates the effects of nudges on social welfare.
4This canonical theory of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Yitzhaki (1974), modeled after the economics of
crime literature (Becker 1968), views the individual as a rational agent with some level of risk aversion who
considers tax evasion as a gamble trading off the benefits of successful evasion against the costs of detection
and punishment.
5Motivated by mounting evidence on various behavioral biases of taxpayers, Farhi and Gabaix (2019)
develops a theory of optimal taxation with behavioral agents also incorporating nudges into this framework.
For a recent review of behavioral public economics literature, see, Bernheim and Taubinsky (2018).
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In this paper, we use methods of meta-analysis6 and ask whether nudges are really
effective in increasing tax compliance levels among individuals and small firms. In so doing
we aim to present a systematic review of the literature and to provide guidance for further
tax experiments and policy interventions. Of course, an alternative and arguably a more
thorough way of surveying the literature can be done through qualitative means. Many
excellent literature reviews have been written, such as Alm (2019), Andreoni et al. (1998),
Slemrod (2007, 2019), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) on tax compliance generally, as well
as Luttmer and Singhal (2014) on tax morale, Mascagni (2018) on tax experiments and
Pomeranz and Vila-Belda (2019) on tax capacity, more specifically. We extend this literature
by performing a systematic empirical analysis of nudging interventions. This is an important
task since as Luttmer and Singhal (2014) put it “similar interventions have produced varying
results in different contexts” and “it would be useful to examine why”. We are aware of two
meta-studies of tax experiments (Alm et al. 2018, Blackwell 2007) which study laboratory
experiments while we focus on field work.7
As opposed to qualitative reviews, our meta-analysis can give more systematic answers
to questions like: i) Are nudges effective in curbing tax evasion? ii) If so, on which margins
of compliance and by how much on average? iii) Which nudge types work more effectively?
iv) Are nudges effective also in the longer horizon? v) Which groups of taxpayers are more
responsive to nudges?
To answer these questions we collect data on 940 treatment effect estimates of tax
compliance coming from 41 studies.8 We divide these data into three different samples
according to the measure of tax compliance employed.9 First is the full sample of t-values
6For a review of these methods, see, Anderson and Kichkha (2017), Nelson and Kennedy (2009), Stanley
et al. (2013), Stanley (2001), Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012).
7Blackwell (2007) concludes that increasing the penalty rate, the marginal per capita return to the public
good and the probability of audit lead to higher tax compliance, meanwhile tax rate has no significant impact
on tax compliance. Focusing on a larger set of papers, Alm et al. (2018) illustrate that audit probability
increases tax compliance on the extensive margin, while audit probability and the tax rate influence tax
compliance negatively on the intensive margin.
8These studies are listed in Table 1. The map in Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of these
experiments as well as of 18 ongoing interventions registered in the randomized control trial (RCT) registry
of the American Economic Association (as retrieved on October 21, 2019).
9Figures 2, 3(a) and 3(b) present the distributions of these three variables.
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where we can study the direction and statistical significance of treatment effects. Second sub-
sample includes 440 observations from 27 papers that study tax compliance at the extensive
margin measured as either the probability to pay or file taxes. Third sub-sample comprises of
172 observations from 17 papers that study tax compliance at the intensive margin measured
as the (log) amount of taxes paid.
Unlike many other meta-studies in economics,10 one advantage of this paper is that we
pool together RCTs which have a relatively high degree of homogeneity in their quality of
identification. The high level of comparability of treatment effects coming from different
interventions makes our conclusions more meaningful.11 Another favorable feature of this
exercise is that we can study magnitudes of effects in addition to their direction since tax
compliance, our dependent variable of interest, can be measured in a relatively standard form.
A third advantage is that since almost all of the studies in our sample implement several
interventions in their experiments, we can use study fixed effects thus obtaining within study
estimates of nudges that control for all study characteristics.
Our main finding is that, in contrast to the recent excitement over nudges, the behavioral
content introduced in the communication between the tax administration and the taxpayer is
not as effective as often thought. We present robust evidence that on average only deterrence
interventions, i.e., nudges informing about audit probabilities and potential penalties, work in
increasing compliance levels. The effects of behavioral letters that inform taxpayers about the
importance of paying taxes for the adequate provision of public goods, about the (positive)
behavior of their peers, or hint towards general appeals of paying taxes as a moral obligation
are on average ineffective. The effect magnitudes of deterrence intervention are moderate as
they increase compliance by 1.5 to 2.5 percentage points on the extensive margin, and 5 to
15 percentage points on the intensive margin compared to taxpayers receiving non-deterrence
10For several recent applications, see, Card et al. (2010, 2017), Feld and Heckemeyer (2011), Gechert
(2015), Heinemann et al. (2018), Lichter et al. (2015), Neisser (2017).
11This argument is one reason behind the methods of meta-analysis being so much more popular in the
field of medical sciences (which often evaluate randomized clinical trials) than in economics (Stanley 2001).
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treatments. These effects are also likely to be bound to a short-run, and may be somewhat
inflated by selective reporting of results.12
A strong way of interpreting this evidence is that individual financial motives, rather
than elements of tax morale13 like social norms or reciprocity remain the first order factors
behind compliance decisions. A competing interpretation, however, is that deterrence and non-
deterrence nudges are not equally effective in shifting the prior beliefs of taxpayers. According
to Pomeranz and Vila-Belda (2019), it may well be that nudges implemented by tax authorities
are more effective in shifting perceptions of audit probabilities than perceptions of social norms.
Either way, our evidence suggests that at the very least the mainstream neoclassical approach
to tax evasion should take into account the possibility that taxpayers are constrained with
information imperfections.
Our additional findings highlight certain design aspects of experiments that make them
more effective. For example we find that nudges communicated through in-person visits
deliver more powerful results in terms of compliance outcomes than nudges communicated
through letters. In terms of different groups of taxpayers, we find that groups having more
non-compliers (such as late-payers) are more likely to be affected by nudges, while groups of
taxpayers typically being less susceptible to non-compliance (such as VAT taxpayers in accor-
dance with arguments of third-party reporting and paper-trail) are less sensitive to nudges. In
general, the types of nudges explain about 34% and 23% of the observed within study vari-
ation in treatment effect estimates of, respectively, extensive and intensive margin responses.
Meanwhile, the additional characteristics of the studies capture another 13% to 19% of the
remaining heterogeneity.
12Both in terms of p-hacking, where marginally significant treatment effects are more likely to be reported
than results narrowly failing to reject the null, as well as file drawer type of bias, where the results not
supporting the likely hypotheses of researchers are not reported.
13See Besley et al. (2019) for theory and evidence on the interaction between individual and social motives
in tax evasion.
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2 Selection of studies
Literature search: We ran a literature search on a rolling basis throughout March to Octo-
ber of 2019. First, we searched for relevant papers using a defined combinations of keywords14
in the main literature databases of the profession.15 Second, to identify ongoing work, we
continued the search in the programs of the main general interest conferences of in economics
as well as the main conferences specializing on behavioral or experimental economics and
public economics.16 Third, we carefully looked through the bibliographic information of the
papers identified in the last two steps to further refine the study sample.
Table 1: List of studies in meta-analysis sample
No Author Country No Author Country
1 Appelgren (2008) Sweden 22 Hasseldine et al. (2007) UK
2 Ariel (2012) Israel 23 Hernandez et al. (2017) Poland
3 Be´rgolo et al. (2017) Uruguay 24 Hiscox (Hiscox) Australia
4 Biddle et al. (2018) Australia 25 Iyer et al. (2010) USA
5 Blumenthal et al. (2001) USA 26 John and Blume (2018) UK
6 Boning et al. (2018) USA 27 Kettle et al. (2016) Guatemala
7 Bott et al. (2017) Norway 28 Kettle et al. (2017) Guatemala
8 Boyer et al. (2016) Germany 29 Kleven et al. (2011) Denmark
9 Brockmeyer et al. (2019) CostaRica 30 Mascagni et al. (2017) Rwanda
10 Castro and Scartascini (2015) Argentina 31 Mascagni et al. (2018) Ethiopia
11 Chirico et al. (2019) USA 32 Meiselman (2018) USA
12 Coleman (1996) USA 33 Ortega and Sanguinetti (2013) Venezuela
13 Del Carpio (2013) Peru 34 Ortega and Scartascini (2015) Columbia
14 De Neve et al. (2019) Belgium 35 Perez-Truglia and Troiano (2018) USA
15 Doerrenberg and Schmitz (2017) Slovenia 36 Pomeranz (2015) Chile
16 Dwenger et al. (2016) Germany 37 Scartascini and Castro (2019) Argentina
17 Eerola et al. (2019) Finland 38 Shimeles et al. (2017) Ethiopia
18 Fellner et al. (2013) Austria 39 Slemrod et al. (2001) USA
19 Gillitzer and Sinning (2018) Australia 40 Torgler (2004) Switzerland
20 Hallsworth et al. (2017) UK 41 Wenzel (2006) Australia
21 Harju et al. (2018) Finland
14The keywords include: randomized controlled trial, RCT, field experiment, nudging, nudges, behavioral
intervention, tax evasion, tax compliance, tax non-compliance.
15The literature databases include: Econlit, Google Scholar, and Science Direct.
16The conferences include: American Economic Association, European Economic Association, ESA, SABE,
WEAI, National Tax Association, International Institute of Public Finance.
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Figure 1: Country coverage of nudging experiments
Source : Own compilation. Data on ongoing experiments is based on the RCT registry of the American
Economic Association.
Study inclusion criteria: For a paper to be included in our sample all of the following
four criteria need to be fulfilled: i) the study is based on a RCT performed at the level
of taxpayers (i.e. individuals or firms rather than, e.g., regions); ii) the trial introduces a
nudging intervention which closely follows the definition of Thaler and Sunstein (2008); iii)
the dependent variable of interest is the tax payment behavior of the taxpayer; and iv) the
resulting study reports all the relevant statistics necessary for our meta-analysis (e.g., effect
sizes along with the standard errors) for at least one treatment effect estimate.
Final sample: After applying these four filters to the list of papers collected from our
extensive search we arrive at an overall sample of 41 studies. These studies are listed in Table
1 in alphabetical order. These 41 experiments were performed in 24 countries situated mainly
in Europe, Africa, Australia and the Americas as presented in the map of Figure 1.
3 Tax compliance measures and types of nudges
Dependent variables: Our total sample comprises of 940 estimates collected from 41
papers. From these data we define three different dependent variables. First is the full sample
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Figure 2: Distribution of t-values in the full sample
Notes : Figure plots a histogram of t-values of treatment effects which we obtained from the primary studies
in our sample. We plot t-values for deterrence and non-deterrence nudges separately. For visual clarity, we
drop 104 outlier observations that lie outside the (-10, 10) range. Vertical lines denote critical values for
two-sided significance tests at t-values of +/-1.645, +/-1.96 and +/-2.58.
of t-values where we can study the direction and statistical significance of effects. Figure 2
presents a histogram of the distribution of t-values. We transform this variable into a dummy
variable that equals 1 when t-values are larger than 1.96 (i.e. the critical value of rejecting the
null hypothesis at 5% level of statistical significance with a two-sided test) and 0 otherwise.17
Our second and third dependent variables measure the magnitude of tax compliance.
In particular, we differentiate between treatment effect estimates that measure the impact
of nudges on extensive margin of tax compliance (i.e., the probability of compliance), and
estimates that measure the impact of nudges on intensive margin of tax compliance (i.e., the
extent of compliance).18 Since the studies under consideration measure tax compliance in
17Such a transformation is common in the meta-analytical literature (see, e.g., Card et al. 2017). We pool
and code the negative and significant treatment effects together with insignificant effects rather than coding
them separately, since as shown in Figure 2 we have very few negative and significant effects. In our baseline
results we define statistical significance at the 5% cutoff, but the results remain stable if we define them at
1% or 10% levels.
18We do not claim that the intensive margin effect is necessarily separable from the extensive margin effect
in all contexts, and rather rely on the respective specification of the primary study. For work that allows
for both intensive and extensive margin responses to taxes, see, Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) and Kleven
and Kreiner (2006) in the context of labor supply responses, and Almunia et al. (2019) in the context of tax
deductible charitable donations.
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Figure 3: Distribution of treatment effects of extensive and intensive margin responses
(a) Probability to comply (b) Log amount of tax paid
Notes : Sub-figure (a) and (b) plot a histograms of treatment effects on extensive and intensive margins of
compliance, respectively, which we obtained from the primary studies in our sample. We plot these treatment
effect for deterrence and non-deterrence nudges separately. For visual clarity, sub-figures (a) and (b) drop,
respectively, 8 and 30 outlier observations that are larger than 0.5.
various ways we lose a substantial number of observations, when we restrict our dependent
variable to either the extensive or the intensive margin of tax compliance. More specifically, our
extensive margin variable includes 440 observations from 27 studies and is measured as either
the probability to pay or file taxes or report taxes. The third dependent variable comprises of
172 observations from 17 papers that study tax compliance at the intensive margin measured
as the log amount of taxes paid. Figures 3 (a) and (b) present histograms of the distribution
of treatment effects on extensive and intensive margins of compliance, respectively.
Deterrence nudges: We classify nudges into two main deterrence and non-deterrence cate-
gories. Each category contains about half of our full sample. To be considered as a deterrence
nudge, the communication between tax administration and taxpayers should specifically con-
tain a threat that highlights one of the economic factors behind the tax compliance decision
as in the canonical model of tax evasion by Allingham and Sandmo (1972): mainly the pos-
sibility of audit and the potential penalty if caught evading. An example of such a nudge is
the following one used by (Castro and Scartascini 2015): “Did you know that if you do not
9
pay the CVP on time for a debt of AR$ 1,000 you will have to disburse AR$ 268 in arrears at
the end of the year and the Municipality can take administrative and legal action?”.19
Main non-deterrence nudges: To be acknowledged as a non-deterrence nudge, the com-
munication content between the tax administration and taxpayers should not contain a threat
that has the potential to alter the taxpayers’ financial motives. The first and main sub-category
of non-deterrence nudges is built on the solid evidence in the literature that taxpayers can be
motivated by such considerations as morality, the perception of fairness, social norms in the
society, provision of public goods by the government and the like. The common nudges in
this sub-category are detailed below:
• Public good, which makes it clear that the taxes paid by individuals are used to finance
public goods and services: “Your tax payment contributes to the funding of publicly
financed services in education, health and other important sectors of society” (Bott
et al. 2017).
• Peer effect, which underlines that the majority of individuals in a given country/community
are complying with taxes: “Nine out of ten people pay their taxes on time” (Hallsworth
et al. 2017).
• Moral appeal, which appeals to morality to influence taxpayer behavior: “If the taxpayers
did not contribute their share, our commune with its 6226 inhabitants would suffer
greatly. With your taxes you help keep Trimbach attractive for its inhabitants” (Torgler
2004).
In our analysis we study deterrence and the main non-deterrence nudges as two coherent
and broad groups of nudge types, and in additional analysis we study the individual effects of
these three types of non-deterrence nudges separately.
19Note that communications including both deterrence and non-deterrence components are classified as
a deterrence nudge given the presence of the threat component. In an additional analysis we label these
communications as mixed deterrence nudges and study their effects separately.
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Other non-deterrence nudges: The second sub-category of non-deterrence nudges mainly
contains manipulations that are utilized “to correct” the taxpayer non-compliance that stems
from such behavioral fallacies as limited attention, procrastination and cognitive overload
among others. For instance, simple reminders are sent to taxpayers to overcome the problem
of limited attention (Hernandez et al. 2017, Mascagni et al. 2017). The problem of cognitive
overload is usually bypassed through the simplification of the communication language, the
introduction of visual stimuli or provision of information how to file the income (De Neve
et al. 2019, Eerola et al. 2019). This sub-category of non-deterrence nudges also include
communications which introduce various types of informational content, such as a sentence
on tax deductible donations (Biddle et al. 2018), phone number for enhanced consumer
service (Coleman 1996), a statement of intent by tax administration to help during the filing
process (Hasseldine et al. 2007), and the like. In the analysis that follows, we group all
these nudges under the common umbrella name Other Non-Deterrence nudges. Although,
the types of nudges in these sub-category are not always coherent in the type of content they
introduce, they make only about a quarter of non-deterrence nudges.
Study characteristics: We account for a number of characteristics that vary within as
well as between studies. In particular we study: i) type of the tax, i.e., personal income
tax, corporate income tax, property tax, VAT, all taxes and other taxes20; ii) communication
channel used by the tax authority to reach out to the taxpayers, i.e., digital letters (e.g., e-
mails, SMS, CAPTCHA), physical letters (e.g., letters, tax bill manipulations), and in-person
visits; iii) response horizon of the compliance measure, i.e., a dummy variable on whether the
time interval between the date on which the nudge was sent and the date when the outcome
variable was measured is shorter or longer than 12 months; iv) the benchmark against which
the interventions are evaluated, i.e., the control group did not receive any communication
(no information), received some neutral information (baseline information, or the comparison
is made against another behavioral intervention (letter)); v) the estimation method of the
20Other taxes include country-specific taxes or fees, e.g., the church tax in Germany, wealth tax in Colombia,
TV license fees in Austria.
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experimental data, i.e.,difference-in-difference, OLS, non-linear, etc.; vi) a dummy whether
the taxpayer is a late payer, i.e., did not comply in paying taxes by the official deadline; vii)
type of the taxpayer, i.e., individuals, business entities, or a sample including both types; viii)
the number of observations in the experiment; ix) publication status of the study, i.e., working
paper or published article; and x) the country where the experiment was conducted.
4 Empirical methodology
Our main interest is to study the effects of deterrence nudges relative to non-deterrence types
of nudges on tax compliance.21 Almost all of the studies in our sample implement several
interventions.22 Therefore, unlike many other meta-analyses in economics, we can exploit the
substantial within-study variation in the data and control for study fixed effects. In extended
results, we are also interested in the question of whether various study-, experiment-, or
country-specific characteristics drive the heterogeneity in results. Some of these characteristics
do not vary within studies, therefore in additional specifications we drop the study fixed effects
and compare the average effects of characteristics across studies.
We estimate the following equation:
Estimateτi,p = α + β
τNudgei,p + γControlsi,p + λp + i,p (1)
where Estimateτi,p is the i
th estimate from paper p of type τ : i) transformed t-value of primary
studies into a dummy variable that equals 1 for treatment effect estimates larger than 1.96,
i.e., that are positive and statistically significant at least at the 5% level, and 0 otherwise; ii)
treatment effects on extensive margin responses, and iii) treatment effects on intensive margin
21The total sample consists of about 940 estimates collected from around 41 primary studies. Around
half of these treatment effects are obtained from deterrence interventions and the other half come from
non-deterrence interventions.
22Since the number of estimates across studies differs, we treat our data as an unbalanced panel. Two
studies do not allow for within-study variation, that is, Blumenthal et al. (2001) with only one estimate and
Torgler (2004) with one type of nudging intervention (moral suasion).
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responses.23 Nudgei,p is a binary variable which equals 1 in case of a deterrence intervention
and 0 in case of a non-deterrence intervention. In additional specifications we define Nudgei,p
more broadly as a categorical variable taking into account the several different types of nudges
as defined in Section 3. λp captures the study fixed effects. i,p is the error term which is
clustered at the level of papers p.24
β is our main coefficient of interest which shows the relative effect of different types
of nudges on the tax compliance measure under study. However, we are also interested in
whether the control variables in Controlsi,p can explain the heterogeneity in the tax compli-
ance measure. Thus, in Equation 1, we introduce the variables i) to x) discussed in Section
3 either one by one or jointly. Table A1 of the Appendix shows the summary statistics of all
dependent and independent variables.
In the choice of our estimation methods we follow a number of recent applications of
meta-analytical techniques in economics (Card et al. 2010, 2017, Feld and Heckemeyer
2011, Gechert 2015, Heinemann et al. 2018, Lichter et al. 2015, Neisser 2017) as well
as a literature reviewing these methods (Nelson and Kennedy 2009, Stanley et al. 2013,
Stanley 2001, Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012). Our simplest specification relies on an
OLS estimator and includes paper fixed effects. Meta-analytical regressions are known to be
heteroskedastic,25 therefore we follow the literature and as a second specification use a WLS
estimator, where as analytical weights we take the inverse of the squared standard error of
the parameter estimates.26 To account for the unbalanced nature of our panel data, in a third
specification we follow Heinemann et al. (2018) and replace the former analytical weights with
inverse of the share of observations per study in relation to the full sample. Note that this
latter method of weighting is also applicable to our full sample of t-values where we study the
statistical significance and direction of estimates. While the former weighting scheme that
23Figures 2, and 3(a) and 3(b) plot the distributions of the three dependent variables, respectively. For a
more detailed description of these variables, see Section 3.
24Estimates are obvioulsy not independent within studies, therefore we choose to cluster errors at this level.
25One form of heteroskedasticity arises because the variance of the individual estimates is negatively related
to the size of the underlying sample and this correlation is likely to be different between the primary studies.
26Due to their wide distribution we follow Card et al. (2017) and winsorize these analytical weights at the
top and bottom deciles. Results remain very similar to alternative winsorizations at 1 or 5 percentiles.
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makes use of standard errors is more standard in the literature, it is obviously appropriate to
use only in specifications where we study the magnitudes of compliance at the extensive and
intensive margins. As a fourth and final estimator we adopt a random effects model,27 which
assumes the existence of a distribution of true effects for distinct studies and populations.
Thus we relax the assumption that for each type of a nudge there exists a single “true” effect
which is common to all studies under consideration.
5 Results
We start by describing our baseline results in Sub-section 5.1, which compare the relative
effects of deterrence nudges to those of non-deterrence nudges within papers. In the following
Sub-section 5.2 we study the relative effects of the more detailed categories of nudges as well
as extend the discussion from relative effects to average effects. Sub-section 5.3 relaxes our
baseline identification strategy of using study fixed effects, which allows to study the role of
a wider set of study characteristics in addition to types of nudges in explaining the variation
in estimated treatment effects. Sub-section 5.4 adopts a number of approaches to examine
traces of publication bias in our sample of RCTs.
5.1 Baseline results: Deterrence and non-deterrence nudges
Table 2 studies the effect of deterrence nudges relative to non-deterrence nudges on the
statistical significance and magnitudes of treatment effect estimates. The dependent variable
in Panel A is the t-value of primary studies transformed to a dummy variable that equals 1 for
estimates that are positive and statistically significant at least at the 5% level, and 0 otherwise.
The dependent variable in Table 2 Panel B measures tax compliance at the extensive margin,
while the one in Panel C measures compliance at the intensive margin.
All regressions include study fixed effects. Odd numbered columns represent the baseline
model, while even numbered columns include the full set of control variables (not reported
27The terminology of random effects in this context should not be confused with the study fixed effects,
the inclusion of dummies for individual studies.
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Table 2: Baseline Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
WLS(se) WLS(se) OLS OLS WLS(n) WLS(n) RE RE
Panel A: Full sample
Deterrence 0.203∗ 0.188∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.221∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.0855) (0.0879) (0.0796) (0.0850) (0.0351) (0.0348)
Observations 940 924 932 916 924 908
Panel B: Extensive margin
Deterrence 0.0137∗∗ 0.0137∗∗ 0.0245∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0208∗∗ 0.0213∗∗ 0.0253∗ 0.0254∗∗
(0.00414) (0.00443) (0.00577) (0.00586) (0.00695) (0.00722) (0.00986) (0.00899)
Observations 440 436 456 452 456 452 440 436
Panel C: Intensive margin
Deterrence 0.0503∗ 0.0617∗ 0.126∗ 0.137∗ 0.0901∗ 0.0980 0.119 0.128
(0.0194) (0.0236) (0.0449) (0.0497) (0.0332) (0.0467) (0.323) (0.310)
Observations 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172
Study fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes : Regressions are estimated according to Equation 1. The dependent variables are: i) Panel A: the t-value of primary
studies transformed to a dummy variable that equals 1 for estimates larger than 1.96 (i.e., that are positive and statistically
significant at least at the 5% level) and 0 otherwise; ii) Panel B: the treatment effect on extensive margin of tax compliance
(probability of compliance); iii) Panel C: the treatment effect on intensive margin of tax compliance (log amoun of taxes paid).
The independent variable of interest is a dummy equal to 1 for all deterrence treatments, and 0 for all non-deterrence
treatments (ommited category). WLS(se) and WLS(n) are weighted least squares estimators which as analytical weights take,
respectively, the inverse of the squared standard error of the parameter estimates (winsorized at top and bottom deciles) and
the inverse of the share of observations per study in relation to the full sample.
in the tables). The table presents these two specifications with and without control variables
across the four alternative estimators as introduced in Section 4.
The most basic OLS estimators collected in Table 2 Panel A show that the studies in our
sample are 20% more likely to find that deterrence nudges increase tax compliance compared
to the effects of non-deterrence nudges (column 3). This result is robust to the inclusion of
our full set of control variables (column 4). The magnitude of this effect somewhat increases
to 22-25% when taking into account the share of estimates per primary study by the WLS
estimator (columns 5-6). Random effects estimator yields results that are similar in magnitude
and are more precisely estimated (columns 7-8).28
28Since the dependent variable in Table 2 Panel A is based on a transformation of t-values, we can not
implement a WLS estimator using the standard errors as analytical weights. The estimations using this method
are otherwise presented in columns 1-2.
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Our sample size decreases by around half when studying the sub-sample of estimates that
measure tax evasion at the extensive margin, but we still have sufficient variation coming from
around 27 studies for identification. The dependent variable is measured homogenously across
the papers and is defined as the probability of a taxpayer to comply with her taxes in a given
time horizon. Table 2 Panel B collects the estimates. Consistent with the previous results we
find that deterrence nudges are more effective in improving the level of tax compliance than
non-deterrence nudges. The effects are robust across all the specifications. The magnitudes
of these effects are fairly small, however, and are in the range of 1.4 to 2.5 percentage
point increase in the probability to comply when receiving deterrence as opposed to receiving
non-deterrence nudges.
Table 2 Panel C studies tax compliance at the intensive margin. Studies use different
measures of intensive margin responses and the most common one of these that we focus
on here studies the log amount of taxes paid. We are left with only about the sixth of our
original sample size which substantially reduces the precision of our estimates. Across the
eight specifications of Table 2, five are statistically significant at the 10% level. Nevertheless,
these results are consistent with the above findings and they indicate that deterrence nudges
increase compliance levels by 5 to 13% more than the non-deterrence nudges (depending on
the estimator under consideration).
5.2 Types of nudges and the baseline effect
In this section we extend the baseline analysis as presented in Section 5.1 in two ways. First,
instead of grouping the multiple types of behavioral interventions into deterrence and non-
deterrence nudges, we more flexibly study whether each of these types of interventions have
effects on tax compliance. More specifically, within the non-deterrence nudge category we
distinguish between the main non-deterrence categories we are interested in – that are Public
Goods, Peer Effects, and Moral Appeals – and Other Non-Deterrence nudges. Within the
deterrence nudge category we also differentiate between pure deterrence and mixed deter-
rence nudges, where the latter type of nudges append a deterrence with a non-deterrence
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Table 3: All Treatments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Full Extensive Extensive Intensive Intensive
Omitted: Other Non-Deterrence nudges
Deterrence 0.178 0.158 0.0212∗ 0.0227∗ 0.0606 0.0641
(0.0903) (0.0907) (0.00880) (0.00951) (0.105) (0.124)
Deterrence Mixed 0.382∗∗ 0.346∗∗ 0.0276∗∗ 0.0249∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗ 0.168∗
(0.117) (0.127) (0.00965) (0.00665) (0.0502) (0.0593)
Public Good -0.0187 -0.0288 -0.00653 -0.00572 -0.0780 -0.0946
(0.0707) (0.0719) (0.00830) (0.00868) (0.105) (0.108)
Peer Effect 0.0467 0.0355 0.00230 0.00353 -0.0863 -0.0930
(0.113) (0.116) (0.0121) (0.0123) (0.0879) (0.0940)
Moral Appeal 0.0204 0.00683 -0.000667 0.000513 -0.0315 -0.0286
(0.108) (0.109) (0.00855) (0.00902) (0.0910) (0.106)
Constant -0.178 -1.195∗∗∗ 0.0497∗∗∗ 0.173 0.0771 -0.0667
(0.0903) (0.234) (0.00545) (0.111) (0.102) (0.626)
Study fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 940 924 456 452 172 172
R2 0.437 0.496 0.340 0.465 0.234 0.419
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes : Regressions are estimated according to Equation 1. The dependent variables are: i) Columns 1-2: the t-value of
primary studies transformed to a dummy variable that equals 1 for estimates larger than 1.96 (i.e., that are positive and
statistically significant at least at the 5% level) and 0 otherwise; ii) Columns 3-4: the treatment effect on extensive margin of
tax compliance (probability of compliance); iii) Columns 5-6: the treatment effect on intensive margin of tax compliance (log
amoun of taxes paid). The independent variable of interest is a categorical variable capturing deterrence treatments, deterrence
mixed treatments, several types of non-deterrence treatments and a group of other non-deterrence treatments (ommited
category).
communication. Second, while in Section 5.1 we showed that deterrence nudges are effective
in increasing compliance as compared to non-deterrence, we are additionally interested in the
question of whether these nudges are effective relative to some baseline. For that reason, we
omit the category of Other Non-Deterrence nudges and study the relative effects of deterrence
and non-deterrence nudges to this reference category.29
The estimates are collected in Table 3 for the three dependent variables of interest. As
in Table 2 all regressions include study fixed effects. To preserve space we report results
only for the simple OLS estimator rather than across all four estimators as in Table 2.30
29As discussed in Section 3, the category of other non-deterrence nudges include reminders to pay taxes,
information on how to file and the like. We believe that, at least in theory, such interventions should not
facilitate responses that work similiar to the underlying response mechanism of the deterrence and main
non-deterrence nudges. Therefore, this category of other non-deterrence nudges may serve as a reference
point to study the effect of deterrence nudges and the main non-deterrence interventions aimed at influencing
taxpayers’ tax morale.
30The results are robust to these estimators and are available upon request.
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Once we distinguish between deterrence and mixed deterrence nudges, i.e. deterrence nudges
that additionally include one of the main types of non-deterrence nudges, the results on
the deterrence category of our treatment variable become somewhat less precise although
the magnitudes are robust to what we found in the baseline results. Although the mixed
deterrence nudges become strong and sizable, in an additional test where we omitted the
simple deterrence category we failed to reject the null hypothesis that mixed deterrence nudges
are not different from deterrence nudges. Regarding the individual effects of three main types
of non-deterrence nudges – Public Goods, Peer Effects, and Moral Appeals – we do not find
evidence that they are statistically distinguishable from zero.
Importantly, these results that compare the types of nudges we are interested in to the
ommited category of neutral nudges support our claims that in addition to the relative effects
of deterrence and non-deterrence nudges, our evidence supports the more general conclusion
that deterrence nudges are effective in increasing compliance while non-deterrence ones are
not. This interpretation is reinforced if we drop study fixed effects and look at the baseline
effect of nudges. The point estimate on the constant term in the regression without any
control variable and nor study fixed effects (column 2 of Table 4) shows that in the baseline
about half of treatment effects find positive and significant effects. Once we control for the
type of the nudge (column 3) the point estimate on the constant term decreases by about
30%, while the inclusion of other study characteristics in addition to the nudge type (column
10) fully explains the remainder of the variation in the baseline effect forcing it to nearly reach
zero.
5.3 Explaining the heterogeneity in treatment effects
The last two sections have documented our baseline finding that deterrence interventions
are effective in increasing tax compliance while non-deterrence interventions are not. By
accounting for the types of nudges we were able to explain about 34% and 23% of the
observed within study variation in treatment effect estimates of, respectively, extensive and
intensive margin responses (see R2 in columns 3 and 5 of Table 3). In this section we study
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how the various additional study characteristics drive our results. Taken together these study
characteristics can explain an additional of 13% to 19% of the remaining heterogeneity in the
treatment effect estimates of nudges (see the difference in R2 between Table 3 columns 3 and
4, and 5 and 6).
Some of these characteristics vary within studies. For example, several papers estimate
tax compliance responses across different time horizons which allows to study whether the
effect of nudges diminishes over time controlling for study fixed effects. However, more
often such characteristics do not vary within studies. For example, we do not have a single
experiment in our sample that was implemented across multiple countries. Therefore, we
relax our baseline model here and include study fixed effects only in one specification as a
robustness test. Otherwise, we test whether our control variables systematically correlate with
the tax compliance measure by including them in the specification first one by one and then
jointly. The variation in most study characteristics we have is limited even after dropping
the study fixed effects. Therefore, in this section we primarily study the full sample of t-
values as shown in Table 4. Estimations on the sub-samples capturing extensive and intensive
margin responses, which contain, respectively, around half and one-sixth of the full sample,
are reported in Table A2 of the Appendix. Table A1 of the Appendix shows the summary
statistics of these chacateristics in each of the three sub-samples.
Several results stand out. First, Table 4 shows evidence for the hypothesis that the
treatment effects are stronger statistically in the short-run compared to the long-run. In
particular, column 10 shows that treatment effects where compliance is measured within 12
month after the interventions are 26% more likely to be statistically significant than treatment
effects measuring compliance after 12 months of the intervention. This result holds even
when exploiting within study variation. When restricting the analysis to the extensive and
intensive margin sub-samples in Table A2 we do not find evidence that the magnitude of
compliance is different in short compared to long horizons. One explanation is that even if
nudge interventions are more likely to yield to significant treatment effects in the short run,
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Table 4: Heterogenous Results: Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Treatment (omitted: Non-Deterrence)
Deterrence 0.185∗ 0.302∗∗ 0.285∗∗ 0.242∗∗ 0.303∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗ 0.210∗∗
(0.0869) (0.0991) (0.0833) (0.0688) (0.0950) (0.0699) (0.0760) (0.0907) (0.0659)
Delivery (omitted: Physical Letter)
Digital Letter 0.119 -0.0768 0.155∗
(0.141) (0.177) (0.0627)
In Person 0.128 0.253∗ 0.235
(0.154) (0.0990) (0.119)
Tax Type (omitted: Corporate Tax)
Income Tax 0.972∗∗∗ 0.177 0.0770
(0.100) (0.112) (0.160)
Property Tax 1.312∗∗∗ -0.131 0.0344
(0.172) (0.0772) (0.180)
VAT -0.0232 -0.384∗∗∗ -0.214∗∗
(0.0964) (0.0574) (0.0711)
Other 0.369∗∗∗ 0.263∗ 0.246∗∗
(0.0908) (0.107) (0.0813)
All 0.194 -0.167 0.107
(0.189) (0.218) (0.137)
Response Horizon (omitted: Long Run)
Short Run 0.346∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗ 0.263∗∗
(0.0887) (0.0974) (0.0863)
Taxpayer Type (omitted: Individual)
Business 0.757∗∗∗ -0.0413 0.0557
(0.134) (0.0682) (0.174)
Individual and Business 0.904∗∗∗ -0.0905 -0.106
(0.130) (0.133) (0.176)
Late-payer sample (omitted: On Time)
Late 0.127∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.0463) (0.0981) (0.0663)
Method (omitted: OLS)
NLPM 0.141 -0.0424 0.102
(0.230) (0.137) (0.103)
LPM 0.0263 0.0561 0.112
(0.127) (0.131) (0.107)
DiD -0.0208 -0.157 -0.0152
(0.0213) (0.130) (0.114)
2SLS -0.0941 0.0851 -0.124
(0.133) (0.195) (0.145)
WLS -0.0470 0.365∗∗∗ -0.0684
(0.0664) (0.0904) (0.0698)
Other -0.219∗ -0.220∗ -0.180∗
(0.0868) (0.100) (0.0699)
Baseline Comparison (omitted: No Info)
Baseline Info -0.953∗∗∗ 0.213 0.121
(0.0543) (0.175) (0.0882)
Letter -0.389∗∗∗ -0.230∗ -0.143
(0.0620) (0.111) (0.0956)
Number of Observations
ln(Number of Observations) 0.0314 -0.0173 0.0112
(0.0323) (0.0325) (0.0131)
Publication Status (omitted: Unpublished)
Published 0.287 -0.263∗ -0.263∗∗∗
(0.181) (0.128) (0.0726)
Constant -1.206∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.379∗∗∗ 0.119 0.283∗∗∗ 0.519 0.484∗∗∗ -0.0977
(0.237) (0.0790) (0.0865) (0.0903) (0.0638) (0.0836) (0.0757) (0.276) (0.0882) (0.213)
Study fixed effects Yes No No No No No No No No No
Observations 933 949 949 949 949 935 944 947 949 933
R2 0.491 0.000 0.092 0.120 0.228 0.122 0.228 0.172 0.153 0.385
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes : Regressions are estimated according to Equation 1. The dependent variable is the t-value of primary studies
transformed to a dummy variable that equals 1 for estimates larger than 1.96 (i.e., that are positive and statistically significant
at least at the 5% level) and 0 otherwise. All regressions are estimates with an OLS model. Column 1 includes study fixed
effects. The independent variables of interest are a set of categorical variables entering the regression one by one. The ommited
category is noted at each sub-heading and is emphasized with bold letters.
the magnitudes of these effects are generally so small that the experiments do not have the
power to discriminate between the magnitudes of short- and long-run effects.
Second, we find that a key feature of the experimental design, its delivery method, in
general matters for compliance. The t-value analysis of Table 4 suggests that interventions
delivered by in-person visits to taxpayers are more likely to find a significant treatment effect
than interventions delivered through letters. This effect is not significant in all models in a
robust way, however Table A2 suggests that the magnitude of compliance measures at both
extensive and intensive margins is substantially higher during personal visits by tax auditors
as compared to treatments delivered by physical letters.
Third, regarding the characteristics of taxpayers, in Table 4 we find that nudges are more
effective when addressing sub-sample of taxpayers who missed their deadline of paying taxes
as well as to the those addressing VAT payers. The evidence on late payers also holds within
studies. Regarding VAT payers, in line with the evidence in Table 4, a nudge delivered to a
VAT payer is 19% less likely to yield a significant treatment difference from the control group
compared to a nudge delivered to a corporate income taxpayer (Column 10). The fact that
VAT is less sensitive to nudging may be due to the low baseline evasion levels of VAT because
of its self-enforcing properties (Naritomi 2019, Pomeranz 2015, Waseem 2019). For both
late and VAT payers the direction of the point estimates as plotted in the reduced sub-samples
in Table A2 go in a similiar direction as in t-value analysis of Table 4 but are typically not
distinguishable from zero.
Finally, in Table A3 of the Appendix we interact these characteristics with the types of
nudges to test whether the effects we find here hold generally for all nudge types or if they are
mainly driven by deterrence nudges. The evidence of Table A3 in general does not support
the hypothesis that the effects of these characteristics are driven by a particular type of a
nudge.
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5.4 Publication selection bias
One standard question often discussed in the meta-analytical literature is that the estimated
treatment effects shown in the primary studies are systematically biased towards positive and
significant effects. The underlying hypothesis is that researchers tend to present results that
show: i) positive effects because it is generally believed that nudges should only have positive
effects (file drawer bias), and ii) statistically significant effects because of the belief that
non-significant effects are harder to publish (p-hacking).
Figure 4: Funnel plots
(a) Extensive margin (b) Intensive margin
Notes : The red undashed (blue dashed) vertical line shows precision weighted (unweighted) mean of the
treatment effect. For visual clarity, sub-figure (a) drops 40 outlier observations that are larger than 500 on
the y-axis, and sub-figure (b) drops 4 obervations that are larger than 10 on the x-axis.
Funnel plots are a common way of visually diagnosing meta-datasets for the file drawer
bias. These plots check for asymmetries in the relation between treatment effect magnitudes
and measures of their precision. The idea is that absent publication bias very imprecise
estimates should be randomly distributed around zero rather than being skewed to the right.
We present funnel plots for our extensive and intensive margin samples in Figures 4 (a) and
(b), where the x-axis plots the size of the treatment effect and the y-axis plots the inverse
standard error of the treatment effects as a measure of precision. The red undashed and blue
dashed vertical lines also show the precision weighted and unweighted means of the treatment
effect. In both samples we observe that the imprecisely estimated treatment effects, i.e.
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Notes : Figures plot histograms of t-values of treatment effects which we obtained from the primary studies
in our sample. For visual clarity, the left sub-figure drops outlier observations that lie outside the (-10, 10)
range. The right sub-figure plots the same data as in the left sub-figure but zooming in to the range (1 , 4).
Vertical lines denote critical values for two-sided significance tests at t-values of 1.645, 1.96 and 2.58. The
kernel density line is estimated according to an Epanechnikov function.
those in the bottom of the funnel plot, tend to be skewed towards positive values. This visual
evidence speaks for the presence of file drawer type bias in our sample.
One approach used to study p-hacking type of bias is to check for unusual patterns around
critical values in the distribution of t-values. Such evidence is presented by Brodeur et al.
(2016). The paper uses a large data comprising of tests published in top economics journals,
and shows a disproportionately large share of tests that narrowly reject the null hypothesis.
We follow this test and plot the distribution of t-values in Figure 5. We observe bunching in
the number of observations of t-values situated just right to the three critical values which
are denoted by vertical lines. We also observe corresponding missing masses on the left sides
of the critical values. This evidence suggests that part of the studies in our sample select
to report results that are statistically significant at conventional level, and ignore treatment
effect estimates that narrowly miss to reject the null hypothesis.
A third and related idea is that, in addition to researchers selecting to report stronger
results in working papers, the similar preferences of journals further amplifies this selection
during the publication process (see, e.g., Andrews and Kasy 2019). This leads to the testable
hypothesis that biased significant and positive treatment effects in working paper versions of
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studies will tend to become even more biased in published versions. We test this hypothesis in
column 9 and 10 of Table 4 by comparing the average differences in significance levels between
working papers and published papers. Table A2 of the Appendix extends the analysis to the
sub-samples measuring responses at the extensive and intensive margins. In contrast to the
view that the peer-review process exacerbate the publication selection bias, Tables 4 shows
that published papers present results that are 30% less likely to be statistically significant
than results shown in working papers. In terms of the magnitudes of treatment effects, Table
A2 does not show evidence that the effects sizes are different between published papers and
working papers either at the extensive or intensive margins.31 The negative and significant
point estimates on the publication status dummy suggests that the peer-review process tends
to serve as a check against the incentives of researchers to report results selectively.
This evidence for selective reporting of results that we find is similiar to the findings of
many other meta-analytical applications in economics. This suggests that empirical studies
implementing RCTs, which are otherwise believed to have relatively sound methodologies, are
not immune to biased reporting of results.32
6 Conclusions
Policy interventions that nudge taxpayers with the aim of increasing compliance have become
an attractive tool among many governments due to their ease of implementation and low
monetary costs. This easy adoption of the policy is demonstrated, for example, by Hjort et al.
(2019) who inform Brazilian mayors about research on the positive tax compliance effects of
reminder letters in an experimental setting and find that the treated municipalities are more
likely to implement nudging interventions. However, little is known about the effectiveness
31We have additionally included a categorical variable in these models that measures the quality of the
journal publishing the paper (distinguishing between top five, top field, second tier field and other journals).
We did not find evidence for differences in either the significance or size of treatment effects between these
journals of different quality.
32See Brodeur et al. (2018) for evidence on how publication selection bias differs by the identification
method used.
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of nudges beyond the evidence presented in individual experiments carried out in different
contexts.
In this paper we summarize the knowledge accumulated so far from over 40 nudging
interventions in a systematic way. We show that, unlike the general excitement over nudges in
policy and academic circles, communications informing taxpayers about the morale aspects of
paying taxes are not very effective in increasing compliance. Although, nudges that threaten
taxpayers with audit probabilities and other elements of deterrence can be effective, the
magnitudes of these effects are fairly small and are likely to be bound to the short-run.
Our evidence in general warns against the widespread and unconditional adoption of tax
nudges in practice. However, this is not to say that nudges are useless. Our evidence on
the particular design features of interventions that make them more effective (e.g., sending
deterrence rather than only non-deterrence letters) combined with the identification of the sub-
populations of taxpayers that are likely to be more sensitive to nudges (e.g., focusing on late-
payers) provide guidance for potentially more effective policy interventions in the future. Note
that the nudges we study are arguably the most common types of behavioral interventions,
but governments can nudge in other ways too. For example, policies that publicly recognize
the top taxpayers and shame the tax delinquents, as studied by Slemrod et al. (2019) and
Dwenger and Treber (2018), or ones that use third-party information reports to pre-fill tax
returns, as studied by Fochmann et al. (2018), Gillitzer and Skov (2018), Kotakorpi and
Laamanen (2016), might as well be considered as nudges in a broader sense of the word.
This review also highlights a number of opportunities for researchers by directing atten-
tion towards gaps in the literature where the evidence has been weak so far. For example,
only few papers test whether nudges work in the longer run, and when implemented repeat-
edly. Evidence on the question of whether the strength of deterrence (e.g., different audit
probabilities or fine rates) and non-deterrence (e.g., different degrees of public goods) nudges
matters is also lacking. Importantly, we do not have much knowledge on whether interventions
interact with the context they operate in. This is not surprising given that randomized control
trials tend to narrowly focus on local environments where the context is fixed. Cross-study
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comparisons such as the one adopted in this paper, on the other hand, are limited due to
methodological concerns in comparing different experiments. Such an analysis in our paper
would be additionally constrained due to the fact that interventions so far have mainly fo-
cused on Europe and the Americas leaving us with little cross-sectional variation to exploit.
Future interventions, possibly ones that span across borders, could try to study i) whether
non-deterrence nudges work more effectively in contexts of higher levels of trust, and ii) if
deterrence nudges work better in uncorrupt environments where audits can be enforced more
credibly compared to institutionally less mature environments.
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Table A1: Summary statistics
Full sample Extensive margin Intensive margin
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Treatment effect size 456 0.059 172 0.648
Treatment effect significance dummy 949 0.535 456 0.634 172 0.698
Nudge type (deterrence=0, non-deterrence=1) 949 0.495 456 0.5 172 0.314
Delivery method 949 0.400 456 0.338 172 0.395
Tax type 949 1.525 456 1.585 172 1.895
response horizon 935 0.889 452 0.887 172 0.849
Taxpayer type 949 0.732 456 0.649 172 0.895
Late payer sample 944 0.449 456 0.581 172 0.616
Method 949 2.299 456 2.355 172 2.238
Baseline comparison 947 1.320 456 1.355 172 1.494
Log number of observation 949 10.126 456 10.156 172 9.979
Publication status 949 0.331 456 0.377 172 0.221
36
Table A2: Heterogenous Results: Robustness at Extensive and Intensive Samples
Extensive Intensive
significance coefficient significance coefficient
Treatment (omitted: Non-Deterrence)
Deterrence 0.266∗ 0.238∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.00616 0.289 0.313 0.137∗ 0.162∗
(0.100) (0.0774) (0.00586) (0.0106) (0.179) (0.164) (0.0497) (0.0666)
Delivery (omitted: Physical Letter)
Digital Letter 0.0558 0.158 0.0973∗∗∗ 0.0377 0.136 0.376 0.109 -0.118
(0.0941) (0.0982) (0.0237) (0.0242) (0.160) (0.187) (0.541) (0.165)
In Person 0.115 0.154 0.198∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.205 0.457∗ 2.640∗∗ 2.003∗∗
(0.139) (0.115) (0.0313) (0.0523) (0.240) (0.202) (0.812) (0.581)
Tax Type (omitted: Corporate Tax)
Income Tax 0.327∗ -0.307 -0.0928∗∗∗ 0.0574 3.152∗∗ 0.296 0.843 0.543
(0.118) (0.221) (0.0165) (0.0451) (0.886) (0.197) (0.706) (0.280)
Property Tax 0.321 -0.505∗ -0.103∗∗∗ 0.0775 5.595∗∗ 0.452 0.604 -0.00635
(0.163) (0.212) (0.0150) (0.0381) (1.844) (0.298) (1.614) (0.412)
VAT -0.110 -0.450∗∗∗ -0.0958 -0.000979 2.159∗ -0.482∗∗ 0.750 0.867∗
(0.236) (0.0897) (0.0587) (0.0201) (0.893) (0.137) (0.711) (0.347)
Other 0.533∗∗ -0.0486 0.183∗∗∗ 0.0346 2.493∗ -0.0588 0.693 1.187∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.0716) (0.0296) (0.0392) (0.893) (0.105) (0.711) (0.234)
All -0.110 -0.466∗ -0.0982 -0.0215 2.493∗ -0.130 0.688 0.880∗∗
(0.236) (0.176) (0.0587) (0.0376) (0.893) (0.117) (0.711) (0.288)
Response Horizon (omitted: Long Run)
Short Run 0.380∗∗ 0.418∗∗ 0.0381 0.0338 0.303 0.406∗ -0.601 -0.685
(0.115) (0.116) (0.0261) (0.0234) (0.154) (0.153) (0.443) (0.566)
Taxpayer Type (omitted: Individual)
Business 0.250∗ -0.272 -0.110∗∗∗ 0.0749 2.255∗ 0.293 0.628 -0.0105
(0.0989) (0.223) (0.0169) (0.0509) (0.800) (0.267) (0.639) (0.416)
Individual and Business 0.568∗∗∗ -0.287 -0.112∗∗∗ 0.0345 2.945∗∗ 0.267 -0.178 -1.010
(0.132) (0.241) (0.0257) (0.0604) (0.966) (0.232) (1.017) (1.023)
Late-payer sample (omitted: On Time)
Late 0.105 0.145 0.00202 0.0462 0.242 -0.0946 0.916 0.778∗∗
(0.0815) (0.0941) (0.00528) (0.0229) (0.266) (0.290) (0.587) (0.217)
Method (omitted: OLS)
NLPM -0.130 0.0580 0.00179 -0.0298 1.691∗∗∗ 0.223 -0.500 -0.459
(0.0799) (0.103) (0.00461) (0.0149) (0.269) (0.346) (0.450) (0.700)
LPM -0.129 0.0148 0.00159 0.0240 1.629∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗ 0.0844 -0.0638
(0.0798) (0.116) (0.00449) (0.0195) (0.252) (0.141) (0.151) (0.242)
DiD -0.463∗∗ -0.210 0.100∗∗ 0.0315 0.106 -0.109 0.0129 0.0924
(0.126) (0.390) (0.0333) (0.0385) (0.0956) (0.219) (0.0737) (0.196)
2SLS -0.0903 -0.107 0.105 0.0992 0.0421 0.0562 2.376 2.385
(0.0696) (0.0699) (0.0730) (0.0689) (0.0349) (0.0356) (1.504) (1.422)
WLS -0.0452 -0.0796 0.0530 0.0461 0.0210 0.0393 1.195 1.111
(0.0348) (0.0652) (0.0365) (0.0352) (0.0175) (0.0317) (0.752) (0.682)
Baseline Comparison (omitted: No Info)
Baseline Info -0.974∗∗∗ 0.0520 -0.0120∗∗ 0.0168 -0.737∗∗ 0.330 0.0724 -0.366
(0.0159) (0.0900) (0.00424) (0.0166) (0.203) (0.219) (0.141) (0.333)
Letter -0.207 -0.246 -0.0110 0.00971 -0.396 -0.341 0.0800 -0.147
(0.112) (0.217) (0.0105) (0.0292) (0.288) (0.229) (0.184) (0.253)
Publication Status (omitted: Unpublished)
Published -0.714∗∗∗ -0.268∗ 0.000266 0.00937 1.581 -0.197 0.697 -0.253
(0.0869) (0.0968) (0.00572) (0.0131) (1.093) (0.118) (0.866) (0.233)
Number of Observations
ln(Observations) -0.0646 -0.0361 -0.00748 -0.0152∗∗∗ -0.160 0.0502 -0.0914 0.0419
(0.0390) (0.0272) (0.0104) (0.00400) (0.145) (0.0245) (0.111) (0.0500)
Constant 0.776∗ 0.857∗∗ 0.168 0.0551 -3.841∗∗∗ -0.695∗∗ -0.137 -0.467
(0.321) (0.298) (0.109) (0.0517) (0.704) (0.220) (0.619) (0.814)
Paper FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Observations 452 452 452 452 172 172 172 172
R2 0.541 0.453 0.465 0.396 0.642 0.499 0.419 0.400
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table A3: Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Extensive Extensive Intensive Intensive Full Full
Treatment (omitted: Non-Deterrence)
Deterrence 0.0242 0.00755 -2.292∗∗ -3.037∗∗∗ 0.161 -0.525
(0.0565) (0.0276) (0.652) (0.311) (0.342) (0.439)
Delivery (omitted: Physical Letter)
Digital Letter -0.0252 0.127∗∗∗ 0.141 0.571∗∗∗ 0.120 0.460∗
(0.0372) (0.0165) (0.253) (1.06e-10) (0.263) (0.207)
In Person -0.0469 0.0967∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.793 0.425 0.565∗∗
(0.0538) (0.0167) (0.0723) (.) (0.262) (0.182)
Tax Type (omitted: Corporate Tax)
Income Tax 0.145∗∗ 0.142∗∗ 0.215 2.789∗∗∗ 0.134 0.383
(0.0486) (0.0491) (0.160) (0.203) (0.224) (0.274)
Property Tax 0.106∗ 0.226∗ 0.779∗∗ 4.850∗∗∗ -0.0105 1.306∗∗∗
(0.0384) (0.0870) (0.261) (0.100) (0.224) (0.293)
VAT 0.00328 -0.0771 0.146 0.205 -0.297∗∗∗ 0.0271
(0.0251) (0.0476) (0.0836) (0.114) (0.0467) (0.0374)
Other 0.128∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.0930 0.137 0.0103 -0.0376
(0.0384) (0.0174) (0.0677) (0.115) (0.165) (0.0963)
All -0.00915 -0.0813 0.110 0.154 -0.156 0.00474
(0.0376) (0.0479) (0.0677) (0.115) (0.121) (0.0591)
Response Horizon (omitted: Long Run)
Short Run 0.0298∗ 0.0285∗∗ 0.0509 0.104 0.240∗ 0.356∗∗∗
(0.0122) (0.00947) (0.111) (0.0928) (0.0900) (0.0884)
Taxpayer Type (omitted: Individual)
Business 0.206∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.235 2.370∗∗∗ 0.0520 0.155
(0.0273) (0.0455) (0.170) (0.203) (0.224) (0.272)
Individual and Business 0.128∗∗ 0.135∗ 0.340 2.713∗∗∗ -0.262 0.192
(0.0382) (0.0526) (0.177) (0.228) (0.225) (0.285)
Late-payer sample (omitted: On Time)
Late 0.0216 0.0150 0.375∗∗∗ -2.415∗∗∗ 0.250∗ 0.122
(0.0225) (0.0124) (0.0367) (0.0210) (0.102) (0.0685)
Baseline Comparison (omitted: No Info)
Baseline Info -0.0538∗ -0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0681 -0.0518 0.181 -0.828∗∗∗
(0.0211) (6.59e-10) (0.106) (0.0601) (0.116) (0.154)
Letter -0.0593 0.0222 0.486 0.254∗ -0.0867 0.139
(0.0318) (0.0179) (0.300) (0.106) (0.161) (0.219)
Middle Income 0.00825 0.0892 0.383∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ -0.0906 0.447∗
(0.0392) (0.0533) (0.0839) (0.0875) (0.290) (0.213)
High Income 0.0295 0.0683 0.618∗∗∗ 2.793∗∗∗ -0.119 0.424
(0.0378) (0.0527) (0.0277) (3.51e-10) (0.262) (0.352)
Interactions
Deterrence × Digital Letter 0.0727 -0.0381∗ 0 0 -0.117 -0.390
(0.0441) (0.0176) (.) (.) (0.255) (0.232)
Deterrence × In Person 0.243∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 1.967∗∗∗ 2.540∗∗∗ -0.467 -0.540∗∗
(0.0580) (0.0195) (0.378) (1.01e-09) (0.266) (0.190)
Deterrence × Income Tax -0.0862 -0.0365 1.147∗ 0.216 -0.0939 0.764∗
(0.0481) (0.0185) (0.418) (0.203) (0.308) (0.298)
Deterrence × Property Tax -0.0427 -0.0443 0 0 0.0954 0.886∗∗
(0.0391) (0.0345) (.) (.) (0.283) (0.304)
Deterrence × VAT -0.0189 -0.0110 1.532∗∗ 2.703∗∗∗ 0.145 0.120
(0.0334) (0.0184) (0.498) (0.114) (0.0980) (0.0975)
Deterrence × Other -0.0874∗ -0.0902∗ 0.847∗∗ 2.719∗∗∗ 0.332 0.858∗∗∗
(0.0406) (0.0407) (0.247) (0.117) (0.192) (0.179)
Deterrence × All 0.0413 -0.00540 1.417∗∗ 2.687∗∗∗ 0.572∗ 0.643∗
(0.0489) (0.0241) (0.398) (0.117) (0.231) (0.246)
Deterrence × Short Run 0.0188 0.0387 -0.166 0.0889 -0.0819 -0.0226
(0.0297) (0.0271) (0.255) (0.117) (0.135) (0.143)
Deterrence × Business -0.135∗∗∗ -0.0384 1.090∗ 0.540∗ -0.104 0.758∗
(0.0347) (0.0211) (0.384) (0.203) (0.318) (0.290)
Deterrence × Individual and Business -0.0415 0 0.953∗ 0.273 0.202 0.968∗∗
(0.0416) (.) (0.369) (0.238) (0.297) (0.309)
Deterrence × Late -0.00168 -0.0228 1.631∗∗ 2.980∗∗∗ 0.117 0.000129
(0.0265) (0.0249) (0.422) (2.29e-09) (0.135) (0.183)
Deterrence × Baseline Info 0.0480 -0.001000 0.238 0.165 -0.130 -0.130
(0.0254) (0.00894) (0.280) (0.114) (0.137) (0.164)
Deterrence × Letter 0.0530 -0.0234 0 0 -0.330∗ -0.616∗∗
(0.0466) (0.0163) (.) (.) (0.161) (0.185)
Deterrence × Middle Income 0.0373 0.0352∗ -0.405 -0.308∗ 0.241 0.0390
(0.0393) (0.0157) (0.280) (0.114) (0.284) (0.302)
Deterrence × High Income 0.0291 0.0519∗∗ 1.098∗ 0 0.245 0.130
(0.0405) (0.0162) (0.480) (.) (0.273) (0.337)
Constant -0.141∗∗∗ -0.213∗ -0.779∗∗ -2.912∗∗∗ 0.0514 -0.942∗∗
(0.0357) (0.0897) (0.220) (0.282) (0.266) (0.335)
Paper FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 452 452 172 172 924 924
R2 0.401 0.458 0.360 0.368 0.385 0.515
Standard errors in parentheses∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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